Let us start with the good news: political engagement is up. Whether because of the rising influence of social media, the polarizing figure of Donald Trump or the pandemic lockdown (idle hands), political conversation and engagement have risen substantially over the last few years and, consequentially, a record voter turnout occurred both in the 2018 midterm and the 2020 presidential elections. It is a good thing when Americans are concerned about their political process enough to be willing to participate in it with their voice and votes. It is civic energy on the rise.
The bad
news for Democrats is that a key assumption held as an article of faith by many
in the leadership, that turnout is good for party results, has been shattered.
In a turnout record breaking election the president-elect, Joe Biden, won by slim
margins in key states and lost soundly in what were believed to be swing
states. In Florida, for example, where turnout is estimated to have been close
to 72%, President Trump won the state by a 3% margin, two congressional
districts flipped back to Republican hands, State House Republicans gained
seven seats, and in the State Senate they gained one. Turnout did not seemingly
increase chances for a Democratic win in the state.
There is also another blue illusion coming out of the election: Arizona. The margin of
victory for the presidential election was very narrow and can be attributed
easily to animosity against Trump, due to his disrespect towards Sen. John
McCain and Sheriff Arpaio’s pardon. But, just like Wisconsin with 11K votes in
2016 flipped Blue this cycle, Arizona could easily do the same in 2024. Grassroots
work by LUCHA (Latinos United for
Change), begun as a backlash to SB1070 (“Papers, please”) may eventually do in
Arizona what Prop. 187 did in California, a formerly reliable Red State (home to Nixon and Reagan), but this has not happened yet. Georgia,
with the recent death of John Lewis driving votes, could easily fall under the
same illusion of a bluish hue, but the Democratic victory in this state seems
more structurally sound that the one in Arizona. January will be an indicator. But
these victories have blurred many a vision with blue tinted glasses.
The biggest
lesson from the election has to do with the Latino vote. Many postmortems are
underway, but the big assumption that “demography is destiny” was another one crushed with
this election. The key takeaway is that the Republican share of the Latino vote
increased. While other variables such as young vote and women’s vote are
comparable to the rest of the electorate, the Latino vote as a whole is less
Democratic than 12 years ago, relatively steady hovering around 66% for the
party, while for the Republicans it has increased from 27 to 32%. Significant
increases in the Latino vote for the Republicans relative to 2016 are notable
in potential swing states such as Nevada (+8% of the Latino vote), Arizona
(+3%), Texas (+6%), Florida (+12%), Ohio (+11%), Iowa (+5%) and Colorado (+7%).
Gains for the Republicans in the share of the Latino vote were also seen in
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Only California, New York and Michigan
saw an increase in the share of Latino vote for the Democratic Party relative
to 2016 (Numbers are from AS/COA). While the final numbers may change, the
trend is clear.
The
Democratic Party has a Latino problem. A recent open question on a social media
group of self-identified Latino democrats (out of approx. 1,000 with about 50
or so active respondents) trying to find out their thoughts on Democratic Party
engagement with the Latino community resulted in a wide variety of answers. This
is a short compilation of them:
1. The most frequent complaint was the lumping of all Latino vote as a generic block: “Mexicans are not Venezuelans, are not Puerto Ricans” is typical of the comments. This indicates a pride of identity of origin and a disdain for being categorized in a single bloc. Heard it before, not new, still valid. The Latino community is widely diverse and racially mixed, with intra-group tensions and, as such, it is a complex group to reach.
2. The second most common point was that there was no clear and aggressive counter message to generic attacks against Democrats. Using a straightforward punch such as “Death to Communism” was in the comments, but counter argued by a belief that there is a “far left” in the party that needs to be appeased. This illustrates such a deep penetration of the Republican message that even party sympathisers believe there are politically extreme and violent elements in, and supported by, the party.
3. The roots of each bloc within first generation Latino voters are ignored, particularly the fear of urban and gang violence (“Law and Order” concerns) and the fear of repressive regimes that call themselves socialists, i.e. the reason they came to the U.S. in the first place.
4. A better understanding of the immigration issue, particularly as a perceived character transformation once citizenship is attained, needs to be achieved. There is a marked difference between recent citizens and second / third generation Latinos and their views on immigration.
5. A “taken for granted” perception of Democratic leadership regarding the Latino vote, manifested as tardy outreach efforts. A two to four year grassroots outreach with tailored messaging and registration drives in the community was suggested. Some people pointed out the “Stacy Abrams model” to apply it in Latino heavy regions. While efforts in this regard have been made in Texas, other factors (3 and 4 above in particular), counterbalanced efforts there. It is not enough to have as an excuse an initial lack of resources for the campaign. Resources and investments need to be long term, not just “final push” ones, that then get perceived as blatant pandering with mariachis, taco salads and cafecitos.
6. More frequent shout outs about problems in their countries of origin. This is a call for empathy.
7. The Cuba opening by Obama is seen as an albatross around Democrat’s necks.
8. The encrypted conversations on social media – and the not so encrypted ones, hiding in plain sight on Spanish language media— included participants peddling outlandish conspiracy theories and allegations, even from foreign countries of origin, never adequately answered.
The
Democratic Party believes itself to be the party of the minorities, which leads
to a mistaken belief that “demographics is destiny” as the nation heads towards
a minority majority country. The 2016
election shifted this (arrogantly self-righteous) pathway to hegemony, because
it changed the electorate. It made people, in particular alienated,
disenfranchised, left-behind people, feel like they actually could have a say
in the way government works. This segment of the electorate is broad based and
multi-ethnic, often men (which increased participation), and is made of people
that want to believe in America. They look at their cornfields, their blue
mountains, their orange groves, their tractors and their factories and have a
vision of what America can be – and want to be a part of it. They are not
deplorables; and include minorities.
The Trump
strategy of self-identifying with American symbols, from the flag to the
anthem, is a typically simple populist ploy with appeal to an electorate
yearning to identify with America. Anecdotes on how after his defeat many
people felt they could be proud of the flag again, indicate that this tactic
worked. While America is part of a
global community, the Republican strategy of separating love for America and
“globalists” was successful, albeit deceitful, and first generation immigrants by definition love America.
Some of these
voters may have ugly biases and shortsighted interests. Some may have a skewed
sense of values, easy prey to snake oil salesmen selling their version of the
Constitution, America or of the enemy. But the results of the 2016 election
made them believe their vote could be counted and they were surprised by that—that’s
why they came out in force in 2020. What these voters mostly have in common is
that they felt alienated from the political process, but no longer. The
establishment’s reaction to Trump made them believe they are being heard at
long last; that it was a reaction to their action. The Democratic Party, if it
wants to maintain its relevance and win elections, should listen to these
voices, because their vote matters. The Latino electorate includes disaffected
Americans that believe the system must change and that the establishment,
personified in the media, the “deep state” and the traditional parties are the
ones that have not given them a fighting chance. Many of these voted for Trump
and what he represents in this worldview. Others have not voted, yet.
To believe
that the Latino bloc does not share a common vision of America as a better
place, under rule of law and equal opportunity for all is mistaken, and obvious
when phrased that way. That is the message that has not been transmitted by the
Democratic Party. That is the message it wants to transmit, but has been
muddled by so many caveats that voters with no time for polls and less for
policy discussions easily switch to emotional shortcuts: “MAGA”, “socialism,”
“pedophiles” and other such paths to cerebral short circuits and base instincts.
It is not a question of engaging in dialogue with these voters, it is a question of
understanding they also want America to thrive and carry them along with her.
It is a vision of success for America that needs to be shared.
The
supposed failure of the Democratic Party’s outreach towards the Latino vote is
a symptom of a blindness towards the electorate in general. In searching to
segment its messaging to blocs, the Party has failed to see the bigger picture
that 2016 clearly presaged: there is a new electorate. Blocs exist within it,
of course, but an overarching messaging is not embraced, a message with a
vision for all Americans, not only a segment of them. Biden’s “Fair Shot”
message, that ultimate vision of the Democratic Party, was good enough to
deliver the Presidency but did not trickle down to the precincts, where necessary
local fights wallowing in misinformation obscured that ultimate goal. As the
first five points of the informal survey taken suggest, the broader inclusion
of Latinos as Americans with American problems, seemed to lack in the
Democratic 2020 election Latino outreach strategy; and probably with other voters
too.
In this new
hypersensitive era of intolerance, divisions play out in a manner that
undermines the messaging of a common vision for America and gives opportunists ammunition
for smear tactics. To strengthen our democracy an effort needs to be made by
all to understand the ‘Americanness” of the new electorate, find a common
vision capturing the newly arisen civic energy across voting blocs, and achieve
the art of the possible in America’s path towards a more Perfect Union.
Carlos J. Rangel
